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Risk Shifting Devices and Third-Party Practice:
The Impact of Skinner and Alvis
Miles J. Zaremski*
and
Paul Cottrell**
INTRODUCTION

Defense counsel in Illinois have a number of legal theories at
their disposal when seeking to avoid a plaintiffs claim or to
transfer the potential liability of their clients in whole or in part
to third parties. These theories can be divided into two major
categories: those that seek to shift the entire burden of liability to
the third party,1 and those that seek to shift only a portion of
the burden. In the first group are claims for implied indemnity
based on the common law theory of active-passive negligence,
claims for contractual indemnity, and claims for breach of an
agreement to purchase insurance. In the second group are claims
based on equitable apportionment and claims for contribution.
The Illinois Supreme Court decisions of Skinner v. ReedPrentice Division Package Machinery Co. 2 and Alvis v. Ribar3
have affected these theories greatly. In its 1978 landmark opinion
in Skinner, the supreme court radically altered tort law in Illinois

* Partner, Fohrman Lurie Sklar & Simon, Ltd., Chicago, Illinois; B.S. 1970, University of Illinois (Champaign); J.D. 1973, Case Western Reserve University.
** Associate, Fohrman Lurie Sklar & Simon, Ltd. Chicago, Illinois; B.A. 1975, University of Delaware; J.D. 1978, University of Chicago.
1. Of course, the third party may also be a codefendant in the underlying action. In
that instance, the third party demand would be styled as a counterclaim under Illinois
rules of practice. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 110,
2-608 (1981). The theories of recovery are the
same and in this article codefendants are included in the term third party.
2. 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d 16, cert. denied sub nom.
Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978). In
Skinner, the court held that a manufacturer defendant in a products liability suit had a
claim for contribution against the plaintiffs negligent employer. See infra notes 6-11 and
accompanying text.
3. 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981). In Alvis, the court held plaintiffs were no longer
barred from recovery because of their contributory negligence, but rather, plaintiffs'
damages would be reduced by the percentage of fault attributable to them. The decision
has prospective application for all cases tried on or after June 8, 1981.
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by adopting the rule of contribution between joint tortfeasors.
When first decided, Skinner was viewed by some commentators
as but a harbinger for the acceptance of comparative fault principles. 4 This prediction was borne out by the court's 1981 decision in Alvis, which replaced the common law doctrines of contributory negligence and last clear chance with the doctrine of
comparative negligence in its pure form.5
In Skinner, a products liability case, the plaintiff employee
filed suit against the manufacturer of a piece of machinery that
had injured the plaintiff.6 The defendant manufacturer asserted
a third-party claim for equitable apportionment of liability
against the plaintiff's employer for the latter's alleged negligence

which contributed to the plaintiffs injuries. The trial court's
dismissal of the claim was affirmed by the appellate court, 7 but
the Illinois Supreme Court reversed.8 While recognizing that
because the injury was not divisible no grounds for an equitable
apportionment claim existed, 9 the court chose to construe the

third-party complaint as a claim for contribution. It then overturned prior case law and held that a right to contribution does
exist under Illinois common law. After rehearing, the court
limited the application of the Skinner rule prospectively to those

claims arising from occurrences on or after March 1, 1978.10 In
1979, the Illinois legislature codified the Skinner decision in the
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act (Contribution Act)."

4. See Zaremski & Berns, Skinner v.Reed-Prentice: Genesis of Comparative Fault in
Illinois?, 67 Ill. B.J. 334 (1979); 70 Ill. 2d at 20, 374 N.E.2d at 446 (Underwood, J.,
dissenting).
5. 85 Iil. 2d at 25, 421 N.E.2d at 897. As explained by the court, under a "pure" form of
comparative negligence, the plaintiff's damages are simply reduced by the percentage of
fault attributable to him. Under a "modified" form of comparative negligence (which was
rejected by the court), a negligent plaintiff may recover so long as the percentage of his
fault does not exceed 50% of the total. Id.
6. 70 Ill. 2d at 4,374 N.E.2d at 438.
7. Id. at 5, 374 N.E.2d at 438.
8. Id. at 16, 374 N.E.2d at 443.
9. See infra notes 119-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the concept of
equitable apportionment.
10. 70 Ill. 2d at 16-17, 374 N.E.2d at 444.
11. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70,
301-305 (1981). Although the court in Skinner gave its
decision prospective application to "claims arising from occurrences on or after March 1,
1978," the Contribution Act used the language "causes of action arising on or after
March 1, 1978." Many appellants have since argued that this deletion substantially
altered the scope of applicability of the contribution rule. The argument is premised on
the fact that a cause of action for contribution under common law could only arise at the
time of payment of the underlying judgment or settlement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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Alvis involved consolidated traffic accident cases in which the
plaintiffs' claims of negligence against the defendants were
barred because of their own contributory negligence. 12 On appeal,
the Illinois Supreme Court again overruled well-established case
law and held that the rule of contributory negligence was abolished and that comparative negligence in its pure form would
apply to all Illinois cases reaching trial on or after June 8, 1981.13
Skinner and Alvis can be viewed as but two halves of the
same principle: the equitable distribution of liability according to
fault. Indeed, the Alvis opinion itself described Skinner as the
case in which "the collateral issue of contribution among joint
tortfeasors [had] already been resolved under the principles of
comparative negligence ....-14 Both cases illustrate that by
fashioning this new system of liability distribution, the Illinois
Supreme Court has sought to achieve the ideal of "total justice."
Nonetheless, Alvis and Skinner have left a host of interpretive
problems in their wake. Although the Contribution Act has
resolved some of these issues, it has spawned many others. And
while several bills have been proposed to codify the doctrine of
comparative negligence, none has passed to date, 5 leaving the
16
courts free to implement the doctrine on their own.

OF TORTS § 886A(2) (1977). Therefore, a right to contribution could not arise until the defendant seeking contribution had paid the underlying plaintiff, regardless of when the occurrence took place. The Illinois Appellate Court, however, has uniformly rejected this
argument, holding that the Act is no more than a codification of Skinner and, therefore,
its scope of applicability is identical to that proposed in Skinner. See Johnson v. Hoover
Water Well Serv., Inc., 108 Ill. App. 3d 994, 1010.12, 439 N.E.2d 1284, 1295-96 (1982);
Balmes v. Hiab-Foco, A.B., 105 Ill. App. 3d 572, 575-76, 434 N.E.2d 482, 484 (1982); Verson
Allsteel Press Co. v. Major Spring & Mfg. Co., 105 Ill. App. 3d 419, 422-23, 434 N.E.2d 456,
459 (1982); Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Ali, 100 Ill. App. 3d 1, 13, 425 N.E.2d 1359, 1368
(1981); Mazanek v. Rockford Drop Forge Co., 98 Ill. App. 3d 956, 960 n.1, 424 N.E.2d 1271,
1276 n.1 (1981); Jackson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 84 Ill. App. 3d 967, 970, 405 N.E.2d
805, 807 (1980) (Barry, J., dissenting); Erickson v. Gilden, 76 Ill. App. 3d 218, 220 n.1, 394
N.E.2d 1076, 1078 n.1 (1979).
This rule was recently challenged in Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., No. 56306, slip op. (Ill.
Sup. Ct. May 18,1983). See infra notes 156-74 and accompanyint text.
12. 85 Ill.
2d at 4, 421 N.E.2d at 887.
13. Id. at 28, 421 N.E.2d at 898.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., S. 1674, 79th Gen. Assembly, 1976 Sess. (1976); H.R. 1093, 80th Gen.
Assembly, 1977 Sess. (1977); H.R. 1368, 80th Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess. (1977); H.R. 1614,
80th Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess. (1977); H.R. 542, 81st Gen. Assembly, 1979 Sess. (1979);
H.R. 784, 81st Gen. Assembly, 1979 Sess. (1979); H.R. 142, 82nd Gen. Assembly, 1981
Sess. (1981).
16. Two minor points should be noted before discussing the substantive theories.
First, apportionment of liability can also be sought as a matter of defense without the
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In light of Skinner, Alvis and their respective progeny, this
article analyzes how Illinois tort law has been altered by the
recent adoption of contribution and comparative negligence theories. Specifically, the authors examine the evolution of risk
shifting devices and their future viability in the context of thirdparty practice. The article concludes with a discussion of recent
Illinois decisions which prevent defendants from ending their
liability through settlement and release agreements.
THE TOTAL SHIFr OF LIABILITY

Implied Indemnity
The common law right to implied indemnity provides that of
two or more joint tortfeasors, the less culpable tortfeasor may
obtain indemnification from the more culpable tortfeasor.1 7 The
conduct of the indemnitor is characterized as active negligence
or the primary cause of injury, while the conduct of the indemnitee is characterized as passive negligence or the secondary cause

filing of formal claims against third parties. For example, with regard to the plaintiff, the
liability which is attributable to his negligence would be raised as an affirmative defense
under the scheme of pure comparative negligence as recognized by Alvis. Although the
Alvis court did not state the procedural method for raising plaintiffs negligence, this
pleading suggestion seems appropriate in light of the defendant's burden of proof. See
Postel, Contributory Negligence: Judge O'Brien's Analysis of Pleading Requirements,
Chi. Daily L Bull., May 24,1982, at 1, col. 1.
Ultimately, upon a finding of plaintiffs negligence, that portion of liability attributable
to the plaintiff would reduce the judgment award. For a discussion of the mechanics of
applying comparative negligence to an actual trial, see Kionka, ComparativeNegligence
Comes to Illinois, 70 ILL. B.J. 16 (1981); see also 1981 ILL JUDICIAL CONFERENCE: COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN ILLINOIS, THE ALVis DECISION (particularly Part II1) (available through
the Illinois Supreme Court); REPORT OF ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT COMMI'ITEE ON JURY
INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE INSTRUCTIONS (1981) (available
through the Illinois Supreme Court). See generally H. WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT: THE
NEGLIGENCE CASE (1978); V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1974).

Second, with regard to codefendants or absent third parties in those cases where no
counterclaim or third-party claim for contribution has been filed, the Illinois Appellate
Court has held, in Cornell v. Langland, 109 Ill. App. 3d 472, 476-77, 440 N.E.2d 985, 988
(1982), that the apportionment of liability cannot be raised by affirmative defense or
otherwise. Even though the jury in that case held that 17.5% of the negligence was
attributable to an absent third party, the court found that joint and several liability was
still the law in Illinois and as such the defendant's judgment could not be reduced by
17.5%. This rule has been affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of Coney v.
J.LG. Indus., Inc., No. 56306, slip. op. (Ill. Sup. Ct. May 18, 1983).
17. Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc., 86 Ill. App. 2d 187, 197-98, 229 N.E.2d 769,
774-75 (1967).
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of injury. 18 The theory arose as a judicial attempt to mitigate
what was perceived to be the harsh effects of the inflexible common law rule which prohibited contribution between joint tortfeasors. 19 As a result, implied indemnity has traditionally been
20
treated as an exception to the no-contribution rule.
Historically, implied indemnity required between the parties
some type of pre-tort relationship giving rise to the duty to
indemnify. 2' Typically, the indemnitee's liability was viewed as
having derived from an implied term of the agreement between
the two parties whose relationship was already well established
in the law. Under such principles as respondeat superior or vicarious liability, implied indemnity would lie as between lessor
24
23
and lessee, 2 2 employer and employee, master and servant,
and principal and agent.2 5 Thus, in this traditional context,
implied indemnity rested on principles of contract or quasicontract.
Active-Passive Negligence
In 1964, however, in a further effort to lessen the harshness of
the no-contribution rule, the Illinois Appellate Court in Reynolds
v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. 26 held that a pre-tort relationship
was no longer required. Rather, the implied right to indemnity
would be permitted between strangers, so long as there was some
qualitative difference in their culpability to justify the shift in

18. Carver v. Grossman, 55 Ill. 2d 507, 511, 305 N.E.2d 161, 163 (1973); Chicago &
Illinois Midland Ry. v. Evans Constr. Co., 32 Ill. 2d 600, 603, 208 N.E.2d 573, 575 (1965).
19. Carver v. Grossman, 55 Ill. 2d 507, 511, 305 N.E.2d 161, 163 (1973); Muhlbauer v.
Kruzel, 39 111. 2d 226, 230, 234 N.E.2d 790, 792 (1968).
Similar concerns also led to the supreme court's adoption in 1973 of the rules of equitable apportionment in the case of Gertz v. Campbell, 55 Ill. 2d 84, 89-90, 302 N.E.2d 40, 43
(1973). Equitable apportionment is a theory of partial indemnity. See infra notes 119-30
and accompanying text. See generally Halligan, Another Look at Consecutive Tortfeasors: Responsibility,Indemnity, Contribution,and Settlement, 70 ILL B.J. 236 (1981).
20. Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). See
Nogacz v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 37 Ill. App. 3d 636, 650, 347 N.E.2d 112, 122 (1975);
Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc., 86 Ill. App. 2d 187, 197, 229 N.E.2d 769, 774 (1967).
21. Van Jacobs v. Parikh, 97 Ill. App. 3d 610, 613, 422 N.E.2d 979, 981 (1981); Muhlbauer v. Kruzel, 39 Ill. 2d 226, 231-32, 234 N.E.2d 790, 793 (1968).
22. See, e.g., Mierzejwski v. Stronczek, 100 Ill. App. 2d 68, 241 N.E.2d 573 (1968); Blaszak v. Union Tank Car Co., 37 Ill. App. 2d 12, 184 N.E.2d 808 (1962).
23. See, e.g., Embree v. DeKalb Forge Co., 49111. App. 2d 85, 199 N.E.2d 250(1964).
24. See, e.g., Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co., 343 Ill. 148, 98
N.E.2d 783 (1951).
25. See, e.g., Virginia Corp. v. Russ, 27 Ill. App. 3d 608, 327 N.E.2d 403(1975).
26. 51 Ill. App. 2d 334, 201 N.E.2d 322 (1964).
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the incidence of liability.27 Thus was born the contemporary
notion of active-passive negligence. This creative expansion of
the principle of implied indemnity beyond its traditional precepts
was justified by the court's strong antipathy to the no-contribution rule and its frustration at the legislature's refusal to abrogate the rule. In the court's view, the no-contribution bar was
grounded in antiquity, when torts were in the main wrongs such
as slander, libel, and assault. In the modem world, however,
where torts primarily involve incidents of industrial accident or
heightened commercial activity, the no-contribution rule thwarted
just resolutions. 28 Although some inequity would continue to
exist until the no-contribution rule was totally abolished, the
expansion of implied indemnity was at least a first step in the
shift of liability from the less to the more culpable party, and
was all that the conservative bench was then willing to take. 29
In trying a claim for common law implied indemnity prior to
the adoption of contribution, the court compared the misconduct
of the two tortfeasors and allowed indemnity only when the misconduct of the indemnitee appeared passive in comparison with
the misconduct of the indemnitor. The conduct of the indemnitor,
compared with that of the indemnitee, would thus be active in
nature and the primary cause of the plaintiffs injuries. 30 Essential to indemnity relief was a recognizable, qualitative distinc31
tion between the conduct, or negligence of the two tortfeasors.
An active tortfeasor was never entitled to implied indemnity
even if the party he sought indemnity from was also found
actively negligent. 32 Moreover, the issue of active-passive negli-

27. Id. at 336-37, 201 N.E.2d at 323.
28. See Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc., 86 111. App. 2d 187, 229 N.E.2d 769 (1967).
29. For an excellent general analysis of this history, see Bua, Third PartyPracticein
Illinois: Express and Implied Indemnity, 25 DE PAUL L. RaV. 287, 296-300 (1976).

30. See Harris v. Algonquin Ready Mix, Inc., 59 Ill. 2d 445, 322 N.E.2d 58 (1974)
(workman was injured when crane brushed high voltage power line and electric utility
was deemed actively negligent for failure to warn of danger); Carver v. Grossman, 55 Ill.
2d 507, 305 N.E.2d 161 (1973) (service station repairman injured when actively negligent
customer turned ignition key while car was in gear).

31.

See Zizzo v. Ben Pekin Corp., 79 Ill. App. 3d 386, 398, 398 N.E.2d 382, 391 (1979)

(subcontractor which provided scaffold and supervisor and created unsafe condition was

actively negligent in comparison to general contractor who merely failed to notice unsafe
condition); Lindner v. Kelso Burnett Elec. Co., 133 Ill. App. 2d 305, 273 N.E.2d 196 (1971)
(party responsible for erection of scaffold is actively negligent).

32. See Johnson v. Hoover Water Well Serv., Inc., 108 Ill. App. 3d 994, 439 N.E.2d 1284
(1982) (well contractor actively negligent for failure to vent well vault properly where gas
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gence and the imposition of third-party indemnity was a question of fact for the jury. 33 If reasonable people could draw different inferences from the facts, the court could not weigh the
34
evidence.
Perhaps the most oft-cited definition of active-passive negligence is that "passive negligence exists where one person negligently brings about a condition or an occasion and active negligence exists where another party negligently acts upon that
condition and perpetrates a wrong. '3 5 But beyond this nebulous
phraseology, there are no clear-cut guidelines as to what constitutes active or passive negligence. 36 The judiciary has frankly
37
admitted that the concepts are imprecise and difficult to apply.
Accordingly, the words "active" and "passive" are viewed as
terms of art whose application must accord with standards developed on a case by case basis. 38 Because the boundaries of activepassive negligence are so elusive, the appellate case law has
been, to put it most charitably, inconsistent. 39 Indeed, these concepts have probably caused more confusion in the appellate
40
court opinions than any other aspect of third-party practice.

exploded); Goodrick v. Bassick Co., 58 Ill.
App. 3d 447, 374 N.E.2d 1262 (1978) (when a
beam sheared by falling column injured worker, general contractor was held actively
negligent for participating in positioning of column); Hanson v. Cresco Lines, Inc., 57 111.
App. 3d 168, 372 N.E.2d 936 (1978) (for automobile-truck collision caused in part by construction flagman, truck driver held actively negligent for not keeping proper lookout and
following vehicles too closely).
33. See Johnson v. Hoover Water Well Serv., Inc., 108 Ill. App. 3d 994,439 N.E.2d 1284
(1982); Zizzo v. Ben Pekin Corp., 79 Ill. App. 3d 386, 398, 398 N.E.2d 382, 391 (1979);
McInerney v. Hasbrook Constr. Co., 62 Ill. 2d 93, 104, 338 N.E.2d 868, 875 (1975); Miller v.
DeWitt, 37 111. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
34. Richard v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 66 Ill. App. 3d 825, 852, 383 N.E.2d 1242, 1262
(1978).
35. Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc., 86 Ill. App. 2d 187, 192-93, 229 N.E.2d 769, 772
(1967) (quoting Southwestern Greyhound Lines v. Crown Coach Co., 178 F.2d 628 (8th
Cir. 1949)).
36. Johnson v. Hoover Water Well Serv., Inc., 108 Ill.
App. 3d 994, 439 N.E.2d 1284
(1982); Richard v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 66 Ill.
App. 3d 825, 851, 383 N.E.2d 1242, 1262
(1978).
37. Marchi v. Indiana Harbor Belt Roadway Co., 83 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 1008, 404
N.E.2d 938, 941 (1980).
38. Id. at 1009, 404 N.E.2d at 941; Moody v. Chicago Transit Auth., 17 Ill.
App. 3d 113,
117, 307 N.E.2d 789, 792-93 (1974).
39. For an exhaustive catalogue of these incongruities, see Bua, supra note 29, at
296-307.
40. See Kissell, Theories of Indemnity as Related to Third Party Practice, 54 CHi. B.
REc. 157, 158 (1973), for a discussion of the concepts of active and passive negligence.

474

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 14

Procedure
As a matter of procedure, claims premised on implied indemnity are subject to the same general pleading requirements as
apply to third-party complaints or, if the action is filed between
codefendants, to counterclaims. 41 Since Illinois remains primarily a fact-pleading jurisdiction, 42 the complaint must allege facts
to support the legal conclusion that the indemnitee was passively negligent while the indemnitor was actively negligent. A
pleading which avers only the legal conclusion itself will be subject to a motion to dismiss. 43 However, the party seeking indemnity is not bound by the characterization of his conduct as posed
in the underlying complaint. Rather, the issue as to whether his
conduct is active or primary is a factual question for the fact
finder to resolve after a hearing on all the evidence. 44 Because of
the definitional problems inherent in the active-passive theory,
judges are reluctant to grant a motion to dismiss where the complaint alleges active conduct on the part of the movant. 45 The
complaint need only evince some possibility of recovery 46 and
should not be dismissed unless it is clear that "in no event"
would the pleader have a proper action against the third party.47
41. ILL REV. STAT ch. 110,
25(2) (third-party proceedings), 38(3) (1981) (counterclaims).
42. Fact pleading is defined as the requirement to plead the specific facts supporting
the elements of one's cause of action. It is to be distinguished from notice pleading, used
in federal court for example, where the pleader need only give notice to the defendant of
the type of claim or recovery which is sought. Illinois practice'requires that a complaint
contain specific allegations of fact from which conclusions may be drawn. Henkhaus v.
Barton, 56 Ill. App. 3d 767, 769,371 N.E.2d 1166, 1168 (1978). Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 8.
43. See Muhlbauer v. Kruzel, 39 Ill. 2d 226, 234 N.E.2d 790 (1968); Preston v. City of
Chicago, 34 Ill. App. 3d 322, 340 N.E.2d 251 (1975).
44. Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 266 N.E.2d 630 (1967); Mierzejwski v. Stronczek,
100 Ill. App. 2d 68, 78, 241 N.E.2d 573, 578 (1978). This legal tenet is based on the practical recognition that complaints are frequently amended and, until the actual evidence is
heard, it is difficult to execute the weighing process necessary to compare properly the
indemnitor's conduct with that of the indemnitee. Blaszek v. Union Tank Car Co., 37 Ill.
App. 2d 12,184 N.E.2d 808 (1962).
45. See Muhlbauer v. Kruzel, 39 Ill. 2d 226, 231, 234 N.E.2d 790, 793 (1968) (where the
supreme court cites numerous decisions which emphasize the difficulty of determining as
a matter of law at the pleading stage that "in no event" would the defendant have an
action). But see Donaldson v. Holy Family Hosp., 94 Ill. App. 3d 285, 418 N.E.2d 873
(1981) (where third-party complaint against plaintiffs employer was dismissed at the
pleading stage).
46. See, e.g., Mierzejwski v. Stronczek, 100 Ill. App. 2d 68, 241 N.E.2d 573 (1968).
47. See Muhlbauer v. Kruzel, 39 Ill. 2d 226, 234 N.E. 2d 790 (1968); Miller v. DeWitt, 37
Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E. 2d 630 (1967); Rome v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 81 111. App. 3d
776, 401 N.E.2d 1032 (1980).
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Under Illinois common law, an action for indemnification does
not accrue until after the indemnitee has been held liable or has
settled with the original plaintiff or claimant. 48 To the contrary,
paragraph 2-406(b) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure 49 al-

lows third-party claims against those "who may be liable" to the
party seeking indemnity. As such, claims may be filed either
during the pendency of the original claim or afterwards as a
separate lawsuit. 50 There does appear to be a split at the appel-

late level, however, as to whether the third-party claim can be
determined before the initial claim establishing liability and
51
damages is determined.
Finally, as a matter of procedure, a third-party claim for
active-passive indemnity is not permitted where the case in chief
is based on breach of contract. 52 The rationale for this rule
appears to be twofold. First, where the underlying claim sounds
in contract, the negligence of the two parties is usually not at
issue and cannot be compared. 53 Second, a breach of contract

48. See, e.g., Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 472 F. Supp.
385, 393 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
49. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-406(b) (1981).
50. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Nalco Chem. Co., 91 111. App. 3d 917, 415 N.E.2d 477 (1980);
Ozark Airlines, Inc. v. Fairchild-Hiller Corp., 71111. App. 3d 637, 390 N.E.2d 444 (1979).
51. Compare Klatt v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 55 Ill. App. 2d 120, 204 N.E.2d 319
(1964), rev'd on other grounds, 33 Ill. 2d 481, 211 N.E.2d 720 (1965) (where the court
decided it could not determine the third-party claim before resolution of the primary
claim) with Nogacz v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 37 Ill. App. 3d 636, 347 N.E.2d 112
(1975) (where the court held it could determine the third-party claim prior to resolution of
the underlying complaint).
52. Talandis Constr. Corp. v. Illinois Bldg. Auth., 23 Ill. App. 3d 929, 935, 321 N.E.2d
154, 159 (1974); Board of Educ. v. Joseph J. Duffy Co., 97 111. App. 2d 158, 162, 240 N.E.2d
5, 7 (1968).
53. However, the active-passive indemnity concept has been applied to areas where
traditionally negligence is not at issue. In the products liability area, for example, claims
for indemnity are permissible despite the notion that strict liability in tort is unrelated to
the measurement of negligence.
The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the products liability concept in Suvada v. White
Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965) (indemnification allowed against manufacturer of defective product). Negligence is irrelevant in determining products liability
because of the latter's doctrinal foundation. As stated in Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams
Mach. & Tool Co., 62 Ill. 2d 77, 82, 338 N.E.2d 857, 860 (1975): "The major purpose of
strict liability is to place the loss caused by defective products on those who create the
risk and reap the profit by placing a defective product in the stream of commerce, regardless of whether the defect resulted from the 'negligence' of the manufacturer."
Indemnity claims can be filed against any party who is positioned "up" the distribution stream of commerce. For example, a retailer may sue a wholesaler and a wholesaler
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would be a breach of an affirmative duty-a matter customarily
regarded as active wrongdoing. Thus, a stranger to a contract
between two parties cannot be compelled to indemnify one of the
parties for breach of contract without the stranger's express or
4
implied agreement to do so.5

may sue a manufacturer, but the manufacturer must assume the ultimate liability for its
product. Thus, the manufacturer of an unreasonably dangerous product is barred from
seeking indemnity from the plaintiff's employer, Burke v. Sky Climber, Inc., 57 Ill. 2d 542,
316 N.E.2d 516 (1974), but may be allowed to seek indemnity against a component manufacturer. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams Mach. & Tool Co., 62 Ill. 2d 77, 338 N.E.2d 857
(1975). Indemnity is barred only where the potential indemnitee is guilty of product misuse or assumes the risk of loss by its use. Id. at 83, 338 N.E.2d at 860. The underlying
rationale for these rules is not based on negligence principles but on the notion that since
the function of products liability is to shift the burden of loss to its creator, the manufacturer, all parties in the distributive chain should be allowed to shift the responsibility for
loss back to the originally responsible party. Id. at 82, 338 N.E.2d at 860.
At first blush, Structural Work Act claims under ILL REV. STAT. ch. 48,
60-69 (1981)
would also seem to produce an inappropriate setting for the negligence weighing concept.
The Act was passed in 1907 in order to promote safety on construction sites. Liability
under the Act is based, at least theoretically, upon the defendant's wilful violation of the
Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 69 (1981). However, active-passive implied indemnity claims
have been held permissible on the ground that although the liability imposed by the Act
does not rest upon negligence principles, there can still be measurable degrees of fault
among those who are accountable under the Act to the injured workman. McInerney v.
Hasbrook Constr. Co., 62 Ill. 2d 93, 104, 338 N.E. 2d 868, 874-75 (1975); Lindner v. Kelso
Burnett Elec. Co., 133 111.App. 2d 305, 273 N.E.2d 196 (1971).
For example, the party who is responsible for the scaffolding and the particular work
which produces the injury is almost always held to be more culpable than the party who
merely supervises or coordinates the overall project. Since neither of these parties can
escape liability to the plaintiff, the purpose of the Act is accomplished, but the less delinquent party may still transfer his statutory liability to the active delinquent. McInerney
v. Hasbrook Constr. Co., 62 Ill. 2d 93, 104, 338 N.E.2d 868, 874 (1975).
It is useful to note here that, in general, since the terms "active" and "passive" are so
difficult to define in a way that is helpful or easily applied to concrete factual settings,
courts have repeatedly held that the issue is to be determined on a case-by-case basis. In
the Structural Work Act field, however, the primary factual scenario is so common and
has been reviewed so often by the courts that the law is firmly established that the one
who erects, constructs, builds and maintains the scaffold is the active tortfeasor as
against the party whose only duty is to inspect or supervise. See, e.g., Lindner v. Kelso
Burnett Elec. Co., 133 Ill. App. 2d 305, 273 N.E.2d 196 (1971).
It should also be noted that indemnification claims against workers are not permitted.
Palier v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 81 Ill. App. 2d 1, 225 N.E.2d 67 (1967). For a general
discussion of the Act and a discussion of its application, see Lurie & Stein, Injured
Workmen: Loss Allocation Among the DirectParticipantsin the Construction Process,23
ST. Louis U.L.J. 292 (1979).
54. See, e.g., Talandis Constr. Corp. v. Illinois Bldg. Auth., 23 Ill. App. 3d 929, 935, 321
N.E. 2d 154, 159 (1974). In Maxfield v. Simmons, 96 Ill. 2d 81, 449 N.E.2d 110 (1983), the
Illinois Supreme Court held that an indemnity agreement can be implied from the contracted relationship existing between the parties.
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Implied Indemnity After Contribution
At least one commentator predicted that the adoption of contribution would supplant the active-passive theory of implied
indemnity,55 yet in Van Jacobs v. Parikh,56 the Illinois Appellate Court ruled that the concept of implied active-passive
indemnity had not been nullified by either the adoption of contribution in the courts or the Contribution Act. As a result,
active-passive indemnity is still a viable theory of recovery under
Illinois' current tort system.57 By holding that the right to implied
indemnity results from "a qualitative distinction between the
conduct of the parties,"5 8 the Van Jacobs court heralded a return
to the classic definition of active-passive negligence. After Van
Jacobs, a party seeking indemnity must allege and prove a pretort relationship between the parties which gives rise to the duty
to idemnify. 59 The decision thus sounded a retreat from the holding in Reynolds v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,60 which had
allowed a claim for indemnity between strangers with no pre-tort
relationship.
While not destroying the law of active-passive indemnity, the
adoption of contribution has significantly changed it. The Van
Jacobs court noted that, traditionally, a clear distinction existed
between the theories of contribution and indemnity. 61 Contribution apportioned liability according to the relative fault of
each party. Indemnity shifted the entire responsibility for the
loss to the more culpable party where the indemnitee was only
technically liable.62 In other words, the indemnitee's liability
resulted solely from the indemnitor's conduct. Whereas the right to

55. Widland, Contribution: The End to Active-Passive Indemnity, 69 ILL B.J. 78
(1980). See also Bua, supra note 29, at 307; Ciosek v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R., 75 Ill.
App. 3d 410, 394 N.E.2d 590 (1979) (dictum); Solar v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 65 Ill.
App. 3d 192, 382 N.E.2d 581 (1978) (dictum). But see Ferrini, The Evolution from Indemnity to Contribution- A Question of the Future, If Any, of Indemnity, 59 CHi. B. REc. 254,
268-70 (1978).
56. 97 Ill.
App. 3d 610, 422 N.E.2d 979 (1981).
57. Id. at 612, 422 N.E.2d at 981. See also Bednar v. Venture Stores, Inc., 106 Ill. App.
3d 454, 457, 436 N.E.2d 46, 48 (1982).
58. 97 Ill. App. 3d at 613, 422 N.E.2d at 981-82.
59. Id. at 613, 422 N.E.2d at 981.
60. 51 Ill.
App. 2d 334, 201 N.E.2d 322 (1964). See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
61. 97 Ill. App. 3d at 612, 422 N.E.2d at 981.
62. Id. Technical liability arose in situations of respondeat superior and vicarious
liability.
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indemnity focused on the pre-tort relationship of the parties, the
right to contribution focused on the culpable conduct of each
party at the time of the injury.
According to Van Jacobs, these historic distinctions were
blurred by judicial efforts to mollify the harsh effects of the nocontribution rule. This judicial expansion of implied indemnity
beyond its original theoretical confines reached its zenith with
the Reynolds decision, in which any need for a pre-tort relationship was wholly abandoned. With the adoption of contribution,
however, the need for expanded indemnity disappeared. 63 The
Van Jacobs court could therefore place implied indemnity back
on its proper theoretical foundation, the pre-tort relationship.
Henceforth, all implied indemnity claims must be based not only
on a qualitative distinction between the conduct of the two parties, but on the pre-tort relationship between them which gives
64
rise to the duty to indemnify.
The Van Jacobs analysis up to this point is unassailable. Yet
from its reasoning one would expect the court to revert to the
"old law" of implied indemnity, where the pre-tort relationship
was squarely fixed in contractual or quasi-contractual relationships. Indeed, the Van Jacobs court states that indemnity derives
from principles of contract and cites to cases which demonstrate
contractual or quasi-contractual relationships, such as lessorlessee, employer-employee, and master-servant, in order to illustrate its point.65 But the Van Jacobs court did not return to the
oldest precepts of pre-tort relationship. Instead, it based the
requirement for a pre-tort relationship squarely on the Illinois
Supreme Court's 1968 opinion in Muhlbauer v. Kruzel,66 which

63. Id. at 613, 422 N.E.2d at 981 (quoting Appel & Michael, ContributionAmong Joint
Tortfeasors in Illinois: An Opportunityfor Legislative and Judicial Cooperation,10 LoY.
U. CHI. L.J. 169 (1979)).
64. See Bednar v. Venture Stores, Inc., 106 Ill. App. 3d 454, 457, 436 N.E.2d 46, 48
(1982). See also supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text. It should be noted that since
the right to contribution does not apply to those cases where the occurrence or accident
giving rise to the underlying claim took place prior to March 1, 1978, the implied indemnity issues in those cases will be governed by the law as it existed before Van Jacobs.
65. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
66. 39 Ill. 2d 226, 234 N.E.2d 790 (1968). The underlying action in Muhlbauer was
brought against a store owner by a passer-by who sustained personal injuries when a

crowd gathered in front of the store to watch a clown. The clown had been hired by one of
the store's suppliers in order to promote the supplier's products. The indemnity complaint
by the store owner against the supplier alleged that the active negligence was that of the
clown who drew the crowd and, therefore, the supplier who hired the clown should
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held that an indemnity complaint must be predicated on a pretort relationship, but which left the exact nature of such relationship in considerable doubt and confusion. In its analysis of the
pre-tort relationship issue, the Muhlbauer court implied that had
the defendant alleged certain facts, a sufficient pre-tort relationship may have existed upon which to base a legal claim for
implied indemnity.6 7 Yet earlier in its discussion the court cited
Reynolds and its progeny with approval, the very cases which
reject any need for a pre-tort relationship. 68
Subsequent opinions have often cited Muhlbauer for the pretort relationship requirement without providing any clarification
as to its nature. 69 According to one commentator, "such a relationship ... possibly might be nothing more than the involvement of the two parties . . . in the causation of injury to the

plaintiff under circumstances that clearly indicate a... distinction in the quality of their misconduct." 70 The most that can be
said about the requirement is that it remains, at present, very
nebulous. 7 1 Therefore, when courts grapple with this issue in the
future, they will have to examine anew the nature of the pre-tort
relationship and the methods for determining which parties are
actively or passively negligent.
Nonetheless, the Van Jacobs court was correct in holding that
the adoption of contribution undercuts the need to further expand
implied indemnity and in resurrecting the pre-tort relationship
test. This is not to encourage a radical reversion to the hoary law
of quasi-contract, however, for there is no doubt that the pre-tort
relationship concept should extend beyond those traditionally
recognized, such as landlord-tenant, employer-employee, and
lessor-lessee. But beyond this, any further alteration of the law
should be grounded squarely on social utility and equity considerations, that is, public policy. Such public policy might best be

indemnify the store owner. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the com-

plaint because the pleading failed to allege the necessary pre-tort relationship.
67. Id. at 232, 234 N.E.2d at 793.
68. Id. at 231, 234 N.E.2d at 793.
69. Compare Moody v. Chicago Transit Auth., 17 111. App. 3d 113, 118, 307 N.E.2d 789,
793 (1974) (Hallett, J., concurring) (interpreting Muhlbauer as having overruled Reynolds
and Sargent by implication) with Mullins v. Crystal Lake Park Dist., 129 Ill. App. 2d 228,
262 N.E.2d 622 (1970) (mere involvement in common tort deemed sufficient for pre-tort
relationship requirement).
70. Kissel, supra note 40, at 160.
71. Bua, supra note 29, at 300.
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served by giving common sense recognition to generally accepted
commercial expectations.
For example, to determine whether a pre-tort relationship exists,
the courts might look to what could be called a "common enterprise" standard. Currently, in commercial settings where multiple parties are involved in a common enterprise, there is a mutual understanding that certain obligations will be performed
only by certain of the parties. Not only are these parties not
strangers to one another, but they have clear expectations as to
the role each is to play in the common enterprise. Legal adoption
of the "common enterprise" test would merely acknowledge these
commonly understood roles and would greatly alleviate the present confusion in indemnity tort law.
To illustrate, the common enterprise test for pre-tort relationship could be used in the field of construction law or Structural
Work Act liability. In any given construction project, there are a
myriad of contractual relationships. Although not all of the parties involved will be in privity with each other, there are welldefined roles and expectations which all of the parties recognize.
According to a well-established division of labor, it is expected
that some of the parties will be responsible for safety and scaffolding while others will not.7 2 Nevertheless, because the scope
of the Structural Work Act has been interpreted so broadly,
73
almost anyone who sets foot on the work site can be sued.
If the underlying goal of the Structural Work Act is to provide
incentives to increase worker safety, it makes sense to allow
those who have no control over safety measures at the job site to
shift the incidence of liability to those who have control. Such
shifting would further not only statutory goals but equitable
goals as well. To further these goals even more, the lack of a
direct contractual relationship should be deemed irrelevant to the

72. For example, a design professional such as an architect or structural engineer
may visit the site periodically in order to answer definitional questions by the owner, the
contractor, or subcontractors regarding the design plans. The design professional may
also make a cursory examination of the work then in progress in order to discern whether
or not the construction is being undertaken according to his design plans. Then too, the
owner may engage the architect to check the progress of the work in order to verify the
percentage of completion and to authorize partial payouts to the building trades. In these
instances, the design professional is uninvolved with scaffolding or safety at the job site.
He also may lack privity with the general contractor or subcontractors who are involved
with such matters.
73. Regarding the broad interpretations given to the Illinois Structural Work Act, see
generally Lurie & Stein, supranote 53.
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issue of whether a pre-tort relationship exists which is sufficient
to give rise to an implied indemnity right. 74 By recognizing the
accepted division of labor and real-life expectations in the construction industry under a common enterprise theory, the courts
would be encouraging the safety goals intended by the Structural Work Act.
In sum, implied indemnity is still a viable risk shifting device
in certain situations. With the adoption of contribution, the traditional requirement of a pre-tort relationship to establish an
implied indemnity claim has reappeared. As a result, the contractual and quasi-contractual foundation for implied indemnity
can be restored, as well as certainty in the case law.
ContractualIndemnity
Contracts for indemnity, commonly referred to as "hold harmless" agreements, have caused almost as much confusion as the
theory of implied indemnity. Indemnity contracts provide a prearranged shift of liability. As in all contract actions, the wording
of the agreement is crucial to the case; but beyond this simple
statement, it is difficult to generalize about the case law of contractual indemnity with confidence.
The fountainhead for the judicial construction of indemnity
agreements is the 1946 Illinois Supreme Court decision rendered
in Westinghouse Electric Elevator Co. v. LaSalle Monroe Building Corp.75 That opinion adopted the then general rule that "an
indemnity contract will not be construed as indemnifying one
against his own negligence, unless such a construction is required
by clear and explicit language of the contract."7 6 Thus was born
the Westinghouse rule which, by first presuming that any
assumption of liability for another's negligence was a rare and
extraordinary event, easily justified strict construction of the
77
contract against the indemnitee.

74. See Zajac v. Illinois Heating & Ventilating Co., 82 Ill. App. 3d 1148, 403 N.E.2d
674 (1980) (Structural Work Act claim where lack of direct contractual relationship

between general contractor and subcontractor did not bar general's indemnity claim).
75. 395 Ill. 429, 70 N.E.2d 604 (1946).
76. Id. at 433, 70 N.E.2d at 607.
77. This is the interpretation of Westinghouse given by the Illinois Appellate Court in
Cox v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 108 Ill. App. 3d 643, 645-46, 439 N.E.2d 126, 128-29
(1982).
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The reluctance of the courts to shift liability from a negligent
party to another party gained force after Westinghouse. While
subsequent cases paid lip service to the notion that indemnity
contracts for one's own negligence were generally valid and
enforceable, most courts applied a tortured construction to the
clear language of the indemnity provision and "strictly construed"
it as violative of the Westinghouse rule. 78 Some of these strained
opinions seem irrational.7 9 In fact, at least one appellate court
has admitted that any attempt to reconcile the various indemnity decisions is entirely futile.80 In those few cases where the
indemnity agreement was upheld, the court usually found both
parties negligent. For the courts, the transfer of liability was
more easily justified where the indemnitor was not an innocent
party, even though the contract language in such cases did not
81
differ significantly from that in Westinghouse and its progeny.
If consistency in the law is a goal to be valued, these erratic
decisions, where the outcome of the case is unrelated to the contract language at issue, should give jurists and practitioners
alike cause for concern. Fortunately, the confusion surrounding
the law of contractual indemnity may soon be lifted by the recent convergence of five events: the Illinois Appellate Court's
interpretation of the Anti-Indemnity Act 8 2 in Cox v. Lumber-

78. See, e.g., Zadak v. Cannon, 59 Ill. 2d 118, 319 N.E.2d 469 (1974); Tatar v. Maxon
Constr. Co., 54 Ill. 2d 64, 294 N.E.2d 272 (1973); Leach v. Eychaner, 1 Ill. App. 3d 327, 273
N.E.2d 55 (1971); Halperin v. Darling & Co., 80 Ill. App. 2d 353, 225 N.E.2d 92 (1967).
79. See, e.g., Zadak v. Cannon, 59 Ill. 2d 118, 319 N.E.2d 469 (1974), where a purchase
order for certain machinery obligated the seller to indemnify the purchaser for injuries
arising from the installation work performed by the seller. The court held that the phrase
"arising out of any such work" referred only to injuries arisingdirectly from the installation work and not injuries merely incurred during the installation work.
80. Tatar v. Maxon Constr. Co., 54 Ill. 2d 64, 67, 294 N.E.2d 272, 273-74 (1973).
81. See, e.g., Fosco v. Anthony R. Delisi, Gen. Constractors, Inc., 103 Ill. App. 2d 457,
243 N.E.2d 871 (1968). See also Bua, supra note 29, at 293.
82. ILL REv. STAT. ch. 29, 1 61-63 (1981). The Act provides:
61. Indemnification of person from person's own negligence-Effect-Enforcement.
§ 1. With respect to contracts or agreements, either public or private, for the
construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of a building, structure, highway, bridge, viaducts or other work dealing with construction, or for any moving, demolition or excavation connected therewith, every covenant, promise or
agreement to indemnify or hold harmless another person from that person's
own negligence is void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable.
62. Application of Act
§ 2. This Act applies only to contracts or agreements entered into after its
effective date.
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mens Mutual Casualty Co.,8 3 the adoption of the right to contri-

bution, recognition of the contractual allocation of loss in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co.,8 4 recognition of
the right to enforce insurance purchase clauses in Zettel v.
Paschen Contractors, Inc.,8 5 and the adoption of comparative
negligence.
Section 1 of the Illinois Anti-Indemnity Act prohibits contracts
for the indemnification of a party's own negligence where the
contract pertains to a construction or excavation project and was
entered into after September 23, 1971. The Anti-Indemnity Act as
a whole is clearly limited to construction contracts.86 In Cox,
however, the appellate court held that the Westinghouse rule of
strict construction was no longer effective as to contracts signed
after September 23, 1971, without limiting its ruling to construction contracts. According to Cox, enactment of section 1 of the
Anti-Indemnity Act expunged any justification for the Westinghouse rule.8 7 While its doctrinal analysis would not appear to
extend beyond the field of construction law, the Cox court made
no such qualification. Hence, the rule of strict construction no
88
longer exists.
With the adoption of contribution in Illinois8

9

prior to Cox, the

indemnitor may have been subject to a third-party suit in any
event. Because of the indemnitor's exposure to such liability,
there is, arguably, less reason to strictly construe liability agreements to protect an innocent indemnitor after contribution.
Most important to the issue of contractual indemnity was the
Illinois Supreme Court opinion in the Moorman case, which held
that economic losses are not recoverable in tort and that the
proper remedy is breach of contact.90 The court based its deci-

63. Construction bonds or insurance contracts-Application of Act
§ 3. This Act does not apply to construction insurance contracts or agreements.
83. 108 Ill. App. 3d 643, 646, 439 N.E.2d 126, 129 (1982).
84. 91111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982).
85. 100 Ill. App. 3d 614, 427 N.E.2d 189 (1981).
86. See supra note 82.
87. 108 Ill. App. 3d at 646, 439 N.E.2d at 129. Westinghouse itself involved a contract
for construction.
88. The Westinghouse rule is still applicable to contracts entered into before September 23, 1971, the effective date of the Anti-Indemnity Act.
89. See supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text.
90. For a general discussion of Moorman, see Bertschy, The Economic Loss Doctrine
in Illinois After Moorman, 71 ILL. B.J. 346 (1983). Bertschy, unfortunately, advocates that
the Moorman rule should not be extended to professional service contracts because this
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sion, in part, on its willingness to defer to the contractual decisions of the parties themselves regarding the allocation of risk.91
In other words, absent bodily injury or physical damage to other
property, the highest court of the state has officially pronounced
its preference for contractual allocation of risk. The Moorman
ruling is a bold undertaking and an indication that the court
clearly intends to demarcate carefully the proper division between
tort claims and contract claims and the interests which they are
92
intended to protect.
In the Zettel case, the Illinois Appellate Court recognized the
right of an indemnitee to sue the indemnitor for breach of contract where the latter has also promised to purchase liability
insurance for the former for the same risks as outlined in the
indemnity clause. Ironically, the Zettel court also held that the
indemnity clause itself was unenforceable because of the AntiIndemnity Act. 93 The practical result of the decision is that the
astute indemnitee need only add an insurance purchase clause to
his hold harmless agreement in order to preserve his right to
94
shift the entire burden of liability to another party.

would eliminate certain malpractice claims, such as legal and accounting malpractice
claims. Id. at 354. But Bertschy fails to note that all contracts for professional services
have an implied term that the services performed shall be executed in a professional and
competent manner with reasonable care and skill. See, e.g., Mississippi Meadows, Inc. v.
Hodson, 13 Ill. App. 3d 24, 299 N.E.2d 359 (1973) (in the absence of a specific contractual
term to the contrary, an architect implicitly represents to his client that he will perform
his services according to the reasonable care and skill usually exercised by one in his
profession). There is therefore no legitimate reason not to extend Moorman to professional service contracts since its applicability will only serve to restrict the doctrinal
basis for the malpractice claim to breach of contract. This interpretation comports with
the philosophical exposition in Moorman between the proper scope of tort law and contract law, and it has the salutary effect of clarifying the doctrinal distinction between
those interests which are the proper concern of tort law and those which are the proper
concern of contract law.
91. 91 Ill. 2d at 78-80, 435 N.E.2d at 447-48.
92. This trend in demarcation serves only to bolster the argument in favor of enforcing indemnity provisions, which are no more than the contractual allocation of risk. It
should also be noted that Moorman provides a new substantive defense under Illinois tort
law. The court held that there was no right to recovery of economic loss on either a
negligence or strict liability theory. Economic loss was defined basically as damages
which are not attributable to personal injury or injury to property. Although there is no
specific holding on this point as yet, the Moorman defense should be available to thirdparty defendants sued for implied indemnity under the active-passive theory.
93. See infra notes 97-118 and accompanying text.
94. Conversely, Zettel will now serve to punish the unwary and those who cannot
afford astute counsel.
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Finally, with the adoption of comparative negligence, the liability exposure to both the indemnitor and the indemnitee is diminished to the extent of the plaintiffs culpability. This also
serves to mitigate the need for, and clear the confusion surrounding, the Westinghouse rule.
In sum, the adoption of the right to contribution and the doctrine of comparative negligence has not directly affected the law
of express contractual indemnity. When coupled with other recent
trends, however, these developments do reinforce what is now a
very compelling argument against strict construction of hold
harmless agreements. The reluctance to allow one to shift the
risk of loss attributable to one's own negligence is based on the
same arguments previously used against allowing liability insurance. 95 If one can buy insurance to cover his own negligence,
barring the right to indemnity for this same risk is a curious
anomaly. 9 6 Under the recent changes in Illinois case law, the
right to shift the risk of liability contractually through indemnification may soon be as acceptable as the purchase of insurance.
Claims for Breach of Contractto PurchaseInsurance
Because section 1 of the Anti-Indemnity Act 9 7 bars indemnification for one's own negligence, astute contract draftsmen have
begun to place insurance purchase provisions immediately next
to the hold harmless clause. Although the indemnification provisions have been uniformly stricken as violative of the AntiIndemnity Act, two first district appellate court decisions, Zettel
v. Paschen Contractors,Inc.98 and Vandygriff v. Commonwealth

95. See Breeden v. Frankford Marine Ace. & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 220 Mo. 327, 423-35,
119 S.W. 576, 606-10 (1909). See generally 7 J. APPELMAN, INSURANCE LAw § 4252 (rev. ed.
1962); Gardner, InsuranceAgainst Tort Liability-An Approach to the Cosmology of the
Law, 15 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 455, 462-63 (1950).
There are cases, of course, where these arguments are still compelling. Indemnity
should not be allowed for intentional torts since this might encourage criminal acts. Sim-

ilarly, although the states are now fairly evenly divided on this question, many states,
including Illinois, do not allow insurance coverage for punitive damages except where
such damages are imposed vicariously. Beaver v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 95 Ill. App. 3d
1122, 420 N.E.2d 1058 (1981). This outcome is also based on public policy arguments.
96. For an excellent discussion of the pros and cons to the allowance of insurance
coverage for punitive damages, compare Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307
F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962) (predicting Florida and Virginia law), with Lazenby v. Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 539, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
97.

I L REV. STAT. ch. 29,

98.

100 Ill. App. 3d 614, 427 N.E.2d 189 (1981).

61 (1981).
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Edison Co.,99 have recently upheld and enforced the insurance
purchase contract.
In Vandygriff, the contract between the owner, Commonwealth
Edison, and the contractor, Gust K. Newburg Construction, required the latter to purchase liability insurance naming the
owner as an insured. The contractor purchased the insurance
and the insurance carrier defended the owner in two personal
injury claims brought under the Illinois Structural Work Act.
The insurance counsel then filed third-party claims against the
contractor seeking common law active-passive indemnity. 10 0 The
contractor moved to dismiss the indemnity claim on the ground
that the insurance was intended to cover its indemnity obligations and, therefore, the contract to purchase insurance by implication provided mutual exculpation to the bargaining parties. 10 1
The trial court dismissed the third-party complaint and the
appellate court affirmed. In doing so, however, the Fourth Division of the First District Appellate Court acknowledged that its
ruling in Vandygriff conflicted with another recent first district
case, Rome v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,10 2 involving almost
identical facts.
In Rome, the Second Division of the First District Appellate
Court had construed contractual provisions regarding the purchase of insurance which were identical to those at issue in
0 3 As in Vandygriff, the general contractor in Rome
Vandygriff.1
had purchased the required liability insurance for the owner,
Commonwealth Edison. In Rome, however, the court allowed an
insurance subrogation claim against the general contractor
because, in its opinion, there was nothing in the contract to indicate that the parties intended the insurance policy to relieve the
04
general contractor from indemnity liability to the owner.1
The Vandygriff court found the reasoning of Rome unpersuasive. Instead, the court stated that since the general contractor
paid the insurance premiums for the owner's coverage, it must
have intended to use the insurance to protect itself from indemnity claims by the owner. 10 5 An important additional fact pres-

99. 87 Ill. App. 3d 374, 408 N.E.2d 1129 (1980).
100. Id. at 375, 408 N.E.2d at 1130.
101. Id. at 376, 408 N.E.2d at 1130-31.
102. 81 Ill. App. 3d 776, 401 N.E.2d 1032 (1980).
103. 87 Ill. App. 3d at 376, 408 N.E.2d at 1130.
104. 81 Ill. App. 3d at 782, 401 N.E.2d at 1036.
105. 87 Ill. App. 3d at 380, 408 N.E.2d at 1133.
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ent in Vandygriff was testimony by representatives of the owner
that the purchase of insurance under the construction contract
10 6
was intended to replace the invalidated indemnity provision.
From this the court concluded that the parties must also have
intended to waive any implied indemnity rights under the com10 7
mon law active-passive theory.
More recently, in the Zettel case, a subcontractor failed to purchase the liability insurance required under its contract with the
general contractor. 0 8 As in Rome and Vandygriff, the construction contract contained both an indemnity provision and a
separate insurance provision. The latter required the subcontractor to purchase liability insurance to protect both itself and the
contractor. 0 9 In addition, it provided that the subcontractor's
own insurance policy must contain contractual liability endorse
ments to cover the liability exposure which the subcontractor
had just assumed under the contract's indemnity provision. The
trial court in Zettel held this insurance purchase provision void
under section 1 of the Anti-Indemnity Act." 0 The appellate court
reversed, noting that an agreement to obtain insurance is not the
same as an agreement of insurance and that the person who
promises to purchase insurance does not thereby become an
insurer."' Nonetheless, the court held that where the promisor
fails to purchase the necessary insurance and is therefore in
breach of the agreement to purchase, the promisor will assume
2
the liabilities of an insurer."
Zettel also held that the promise to obtain insurance is not the
same as a promise to indemnify. 1 3 Under an indemnity agree-

106. Id. at' 1, 408 N.E.2d at 1132.
107. Id.
108. 100 Ill. App. 3d at 615, 427. N.E.2d at 190.
109. Id. The terms of the contract also required that the liability insurance coverage
extend to the owner and architect.
110. Id. at 616, 427 N.E.2d at 190.
111. Id. at 617, 427 N.E.2d at 191.
112. Id. at 617-18, 427 N.E.2d at 192.
113. It is important to note the difference between an indemnity agreement and an
agreement to purchase insurance. Under an indemnity agreement, the promisor assumes
all responsibility for damages. Under an agreement to obtain insurance, the promisor
agrees only to procure insurance and pay the premium. The promisor's responsibility
ends at that point, since even if the insurer wrongfully declines a claim, a breach of the
insurance agreement would result and not a breach of the agreement to purchase insurance. This is an important distinction and one on which the Zettel court relied.
Generally, the doctrinal distinctions between insurance, indemnity, and contribution
are important because of the manner in which the courts reach apparently conflicting
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ment, the promisor agrees to assume all responsibility for liability for any damages. By an agreement to obtain insurance, however, the promisor merely agrees to procure an insurance policy
and pay the premium. After the insurance is purchased, the obligations of the promisor are at an end. He is not liable for subsequent damages even if the insurer should wrongfully fail to pro14
vide coverage, since he was not at fault.'
The Zettel court held further that the agreement to purchase
insurance coverage was enforceable even though it covered the
same risk as the unenforceable indemnity agreement.1 1 5 The
opinion pointed out that section 3 of the Anti-Indemnity Act
allowed the general contractor to purchase insurance to cover its
liabilities." 6 In the court's view, therefore, it was immaterial
whether the contractor obtained this insurance through an insurance agent or through a subcontractor." 7 The same purpose
would be served in either event, that of assuring compensation
for injured workers. Because it was proper under the statute to
obtain insurance directly, there appeared no compelling reason
why an agreement to obtain insurance should be voidable." 8
The decisions rendered in Vandygriff and Zettel call into
serious question the future of the Anti-Indemnity Act. The cases
hold that there is no compelling public policy reason for not
enforcing agreements to purchase insurance where the purpose
of the Act, protection of workers, is preserved. Logically, there is

decisions depending upon the theory addressed. For example, in Van Jacobs v. Parikh,
97 Ill. App. 3d 610, 422 N.E.2d 979 (1981), the court held that implied indemnity claims
have survived the Contribution Act, and that such claims are not barred by section 2(d)
of the Act even though the third-party defendant has reached settlement with the underlying plaintiff. Contribution claims against this same third-party defendant, however,
would be barred by section 2(d). Lastly, contribution is to be distinguished from indemnity in that the former is only a partial shift of liability, while the latter is a complete
shift of liability.
114. The Zettel court pointed out that the damages recoverable for the breach of a
contract to obtain insurance include all damages caused by the breach. The court stated
that this would include the amount of any judgment secured against the intended insured
up to the amount of the policy limits bargained for (or perhaps even beyond the policy
limits in instances where the insurer would have settled the case rather than allowed it to
go to judgment), plus the cost of defending the tort action. 100 Ill. App. 3d at 618, 427
N.E.2d at 192. Query whether the recoverable damages would also include the cost of
securing judgment against the indemnitor for its failure to honor the insurance purchase
agreement.
115. Id. at 619, 427 N.E.2d at 192.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 619-20, 427N.E.2d at 193.
118. Id.
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no rational reason to uphold the Act at all, for its implementation only punishes those who fail to include an insurance purchase clause in their construction contracts.
PARTIAL SHIFT OF LIABILITY
Equitable Apportionment
The theory of equitable apportionment emerged in Illinois with
the 1973 supreme court decision of Gertz v. Campbell.1 1 9 In
Gertz, the plaintiff pedestrian was injured when struck by an
automobile driven by the defendant, Campbell. Gertz was taken
to a hospital where, due to alleged improper treatment by Dr.
Snyder, his leg was amputated. Gertz, however, sued only Campbell, who then brought a third-party claim against Dr. Snyder
seeking indemnity for any damages attributable to the doctor's
alleged malpractice. The trial court dismissed the third-party
complaint, but the appellate court reversed and held that Camp120
bell had stated a cognizable claim for "equitable apportionment."
The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the appellate
court ruling.

121

The supreme court first noted that Campbell's claim could not
be disallowed as one for contribution between joint tortfeasors
(not then available in Illinois), since Campbell and Dr. Snyder
were not joint tortfeasors. 122 Under the court's definition, because
neither of the alleged tortfeasors had control over the acts of the
other, and the wrongful conduct as well as the injuries occurred
at different times, the physician and the driver could not be
deemed joint tortfeasors.1 23 Instead, the court recognized Campbell's claim as one for equitable apportionment, which it defined
as the right of the original tortfeasor to recover for those damages caused solely by injuries attributable to the third party's
negligence.124
The theory of equitable apportionment developed from the

119. 55 111. 2d 85, 302 N.E.2d 40 (1973). See generally Halligan, Another Look at Consecutive Tortfeasors:Responsibility,Indemnity, Contribution,and Settlement, 70 ILL B.J.

235 (1981).
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

4 Ill.
App. 3d 806, 282 N.E.2d 28 (1972).
55 Ill.
2d at 93, 302 N.E.2d at 45.
Id. at 88-89, 302 N.E.2d at 43.
Id. at 89, 302 N.E.2d at 43.
Id. at 91-92, 302 N.E.2d at 4445.
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principle that everyone is responsible for the consequences of his
own wrongdoing. While not allowing the original tortfeasor to
shift his own liability, the theory does allow him to recoup those
damages which result solely from the subsequent tortfeasor's
conduct. Under traditional rules, the plaintiff can recover from
the original tortfeasor damages attributable to both the original
injury and any aggravation of the injury caused by a subsequent
tortfeasor's negligence. 125 Under equitable apportionment, the
original defendant can recover from the third-party defendant
only where the injuries are divisible according to the respective
negligence of the tortfeasors. As with the theory of active-passive
indemnity, the defendant who seeks equitable apportionment is
not bound by the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint, and
even if he is sued for intentional misconduct, it is up to the fact
finder to decide whether his conduct was intentional. 26 But
unlike active-passive implied indemnity, the court does not compare the culpability of the two parties in a claim for equitable
apportionment.
After the adoption of contribution and comparative negligence,
the Illinois Appellate Court took the position that there was no
longer any need for an action based on Gertz. In Van Jacobs v.
Parikh,127 for example, the court examined whether the thirdparty defendant's settlement with the original plaintiff barred
the equitable apportionment claim by reason of section 2(d) of
the Contribution Act.1 28 That provision discharges settling parties from liability for contribution. The Van Jacobs court held
that the third-party claim was identical to a claim for contribution, 129 although couched in terms of equitable apportionment,
and as such was barred under section 2(d) because of the prior
settlement.130
With the adoption of contribution and the express equating of
equitable apportionment with contribution, Gertz actions are no
longer necessary. The policy considerations underlying Gertz,
which sought mitigation of the inflexible and inequitable rule of

125.
72 N.E.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 88, 302 N.E.2d at 43. The court cites Chicago City Ry. v. Saxby, 213 Ill. 274,
755 (1904) and W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 61(4th ed. 1971).
See Neuman v. City of Chicago, 110 Ill. App. 3d 907, 443 N.E.2d 626 (1982).
97 Ill. App. 3d 610, 422 N.E.2d 979 (1981).
See infra note 132 for the text of § 2(d).
97 Ill. App. 3d at 614, 422 N.E.2d at 982. The court noted that Skinner itself held

that a claim mislabeled as one for indemnity will be construed as a claim for contribution.
130. Claims for equitable apportionment will be allowed in all instances where the
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no contribution, are now carried out under contribution. Equitable apportionment is but an historical risk shifting device linking the common law prohibition and the current acceptance of
contribution.
Contribution
The right to contribution was ushered into Illinois by the
supreme court's 1978 decision in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division PackageMachinery Co.131 This new right was subsequently
codified in the Illinois Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors
Act.132 Basically, the Act provides that, whenever two or more
persons are subject to liability in tort arising out of the same
injury to person or property, there is a right of contribution
underlying occurrence or accident took place prior to March 1, 1978. See supra note 11.
See, e.g., Neuman v. City of Chicago, 110 Ill. App. 3d 907, 443 N.E.2d 626 (1982).
131. 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d 16, cert. denied sub nom.
Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
132. Public Act 81-601 (1981) (codified at ILL REV. STAT. ch. 70,
301-305 (1981) and
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83,
15.2 (1981)). The latter provision provides for a limitation of two

years from payment. The Act provides as follows:
§1. This Act applies to causes of action arising on or after March 1, 1978.
§2. Right of Contribution.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, where 2 or more persons are subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury to person or property, or the
same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them, even though

judgment has not been entered against any or all of them.
(b) The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid
more than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery is

limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share. No tortfeasor
is liable to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the common
liability.
(c) When a release or covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given
in good faith to one or more persons liable in tort arising out of the same injury
or the same wrongful death, it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors
from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless the terms so provide but it
reduces the recovery on any claim against the others to the extent of any
amount of the consideration actually paid for it, whichever is greater.
(d) The tortfeasor who settles with a claimant pursuant to paragraph (c) is
discharged from all liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasor.
(e) A tortfeasor who settles with a claimant pursuant to paragraph (c) is not
entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability is not
extinguished by the settlement.
(f) Anyone who, by payment, has discharged in full or in part the liability of a
tortfeasor and has thereby discharged in full his obligation to the tortfeasor, is
subrogated to the tortfeasor's right of contribution. This provision does not
affect any right of contribution nor any right of subrogation arising from any
other relationship.
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among them. 133 The amount of contribution is to be determined
34
according to the relative culpability of each of the tortfeasors.1
The Act further provides that any tortfeasor who settles with the
underlying claimant will be discharged from all liability for contribution to any of the remaining tortfeasors. 135 Lastly, the statute allows a claim for contribution to be brought either before or
after payment. 36 In this regard, the Act changes the common
law rule that such rights do not accrue until payment.137
A great deal of decisional law has followed the enactment of
the contribution right, with the scope of its applicability now
fairly established. First, the right to contribution has been held
to apply only to those cases involving accidents or occurrences
which took place on or after March 1, 1978.138 Second, the right

1 39
to statutory contribution is not limited to strict liability cases.
Finally, the courts have sought to broaden the applicability of
the contribution right and, concomitantly, have uniformly discarded any immunity bar.140

§3. Amount of Contribution.
The pro rata share of each tortfeasor shall be determined in accordance with
his relative culpability. However, no person shall be required to contribute to
one seeking contribution an amount greater than his pro rata share unless the
obligation of one or more of the joint tortfeasors is uncollectible. In that event,
the remaining tortfeasors shall share the unpaid portions of the uncollectible
obligation in acordance with their pro rata liability. If equity requires, the collective liability of some as a group shall constitute a single share.
§4. Rights of Plaintiff Unaffected.
A plaintiffs right to recover the full amount of his judgment from any one or
more defendants subject to liability in tort for the same injury to person or
property, or for wrongful death, is not affected by the provisions of this Act.
§5. Enforcement.
A cause of action for contribution among joint tortfeasors may be asserted by a
separate action before or after payment, by counterclaim or by third-party complaint in a pending action.
133. See supra note 132 for the text of § 2(a).
134. See supra note 132 for the text of § 3.
135. See supra note 132 for the text of § 2(d).
136. See supra note 132 for the text of § 5.
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A(2) (1979). Accord In re Johns-Manville
Asbestosis Cases, 516 F. Supp. 375, 378 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (under Skinner, right to contribution accrues upon payment); Pozsgay v. Free, 87 Ill. App. 3d 1133, 409 N.E.2d 554 (1980)
(contribution between joint debtors); see also Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330 (7th Cir.
1979) (implied right of contribution in federal securities case).
138. See supra note 11.
139. See, e.g., Erickson v. Gilden, 76 Ill. App. 3d 218, 394 N.E.2d 1076(1980).
140. This would appear to contradict the rule that because the right to contribution
only applies to those liable in tort to the underlying claimant, and because a party with a
statutory or common law immunity is not liable to the underlying claimant, the immune
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For instance, in Stephens v. McBride,141 the appellate court
held that the notice provisions of the Local Governments and
Governmental Employees' Tort Immunity Act 1 4 2 will not bar a

contribution claim. In other words, the party seeking contribution need not give the statutory notice of claim to the governmental entity which is required under the statute. The court reasoned that the public policy underlying the right of contribution
outweighed that of the notice provisions. 43 Equitable considerations also weighed heavily in the Stephens case, where the plaintiff had filed a tort action for personal injury only against an
individual and within the general two-year statute of limitations,
but after the one-year limitation in the notice provision had
144
passed.
Ordinarily, under the Act, the plaintiffs failure to join the
local government entity and to give the required notice would
have barred the defendant's right to contribution from the negligent governmental entity. 145 Because of this potential inequity,
the court held that failure to comply with the notice provisions of
the Act would only serve to bar direct suits by the injured party
146
against the local entity.
Following Stephens, in Wirth v. City of HighlandPark,147 the
court held that statutory interspousal immunity would not bar a
third-party claim for contribution. The rule of Wirth was extended

party would not be liable for contribution claims to the underlying or non-immune
defendant. This majority rule was stated in Glass v. Stahl Specialty Co., 10 PROD. SAFETY

& IAAB. REP. (BNA) 719 (1982); see also Doyle v. Rhodes, 109 Ill. App. 3d 590, 440 N.E.2d
895 (1982), case under advisement, No. 57540 (Ill. Sup. Ct. May Term 1983) (contribution
claim against the plaintiff's employer allowed, even though the plaintiffs direct claim
against the employer is barred by the Illinois Worker's Compensation Act); Morgan v.
Kirk Bros., 111 Ill. App. 3d 914, 444 N.E.2d 504 (1982) (third-party complaint for contribution based on Dram Shop Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 43, 135 (1981), allowed even though
third-party plaintiff could not sue third-party defendant under the Dram Shop Act).
141. 105 Ill. App. 3d 880, 435 N.E.2d 162 (1982), case under advisement, No. 56665 (Ill.
Sup. Ct. May Term 1983).
142. ILL REv. STAT. ch. 85,
1-101 to 10-101 (1981).
143. 105 Ill. App. 3d at 885, 435 N.E.2d at 166.
144. Id. at 881-82, 435 N.E.2d at 163.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 885, 435 N.E.2d at 166.
147. 102 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 430 N.E.2d 236 (1981). The Wirth case involved a two-car
accident where one car contained a husband and wife. The spouse non-driver of the first
car sued the driver of the second car. The driver of the second car then brought a thirdparty contribution claim against the spouse driver of the first car. The third-party
defendant raised the statutory interspousal immunity as a bar to the contribution claim,
but the court rejected this argument on equitable grounds.
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still further in the case of Larson v. Bushkamp.148 Larson held
that the common law parent-child tort immunity doctrine would
not serve as a bar to contribution claims brought by the original
defendant against the parent, where the original claimant was
149
the child of the third-party parent.
The reason behind this continued expansion of contribution
was most recently explained by the appellate court in Doyle v.
Rhodes.150 The Doyle court specifically held that the Illinois
Worker's Compensation Act prohibition against direct liability
claims by the injured worker against his employer would not bar
a third-party claim against the employer for contribution. 151 In
reaching its decision, the court reviewed both Wirth and Larson
and found as a common thread the courts' recognition that
underlying the right to contribution was the equitable doctrine of
unjust enrichment. Contribution was, therefore, a separate right
of restitution, and not a derivative right.15 2 As such, any common law or statutory immunity bar that would preclude the
primary claimant from pursuing a direct action against the third
party from whom contribution is sought would not necessarily
bar the original defendant from seeking contribution against the
same third party. The court also noted as significant the reference in the Contribution Act to the parties' relative culpability,
rather than relative liability. 53 Of primary importance to the

148.

105 Ill. App. 3d 965, 435 N.E.2d 221 (1982). Larson was also a two-car accident

case in which a minor was injured while riding as a passenger in a car operated by his
father. The minor sued the driver of the second car who then sought contribution from
the father. The father moved to dismiss the contribution claim under the parent-child tort
immunity doctrine. This motion was granted by the trial court, but the Illinois Appellate
Court reversed after weighing the competing public policy considerations underlying the
contribution statute and the common law bar to parent-child lawsuits.
The Larson court noted that several cases had already restricted application of the
doctrine by sanctioning certain direct parent-child tort suits. According to this line of
case law, the allowance of such claims would not endanger the parent-child relationship.
In the court's view, the injury itself would be the truly disrupting factor to domestic
peace, rather than the risk of depleting the family's financial resources. Moreover, as a
practical matter, the widespread use of liability insurance mitigated the disruption possibility. Contribution would therefore be allowed against the parent of an injured minor
plaintiff, where the parent's alleged negligence contributed to the minor's injuries. Id. at
970, 435 N.E.2d at 225.
149. Id. at 970-71, 435 N.E.2d at 225.
150. 109 Ill. App. 3d 590, 440 N.E.2d 895 (1982), case under advisement, No. 57540 (Ill.
Sup. Ct. May Term 1983).
151. Id. at 593, 440 N.E.2d at 897.
152. Id. at 592, 440 N.E.2d at 897.
153. Id. at 593, 440 N.E.2d at 897.
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Doyle court, however, was the Skinner decision itself, which had
allowed a contribution claim by the original defendant manufac154
turer of a defective product against the plaintiffs employer.
Skinner, however, made no mention of the Worker Compensation Act or its prohibition against direct actions. Doyle, therefore, provides the added doctrinal analysis to justify such risk
shifting claims.
Contribution is one of the most important and prevalent methods for shifting liability. The policy concerns of placing the loss
on the party responsible for causing it have overriden traditional
immunity bars and will apparently continue to do so.
ComparativeNegligence
Comparative negligence is a device which allows the defendant to shift part of its liability to the plaintiff. Because it is not
used to apportion liability among codefendants or other third
parties, it is not a matter of third-party practice. Nevertheless,
the recent adoption of comparative negligence in Illinois in Alvis
v. Ribar15 5 was said to have significantly affected several important rules governing third-party practice. This controversy has
just recently been resolved by the Illinois Supreme Court in
156
Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc.
In Coney, the plaintiff filed a product liability claim on behalf
of the decedent who died on a hydraulic manlift manufacturered
by the defendant. The defendant raised two affirmative defenses:
the comparative negligence of the decedent and the contributory
negligence of the decedent's employer. The plaintiff could not sue
154. Id. As a procedural matter, the appellate court has suggested that when an
action is pending, the contribution claim should be asserted by counterclaim or by thirdparty claim in that action. Tisoncik v. Szczepankiewicz, 113 Ill. App. 3d 240, 446 N.E.2d
1271 (1983). Tisoncik held that the defendant-appellant had no standing to appeal a
directed verdict in favor of a codefendant when the defendant-appellant had not filed a
contribution claim against that codefendant. The appellant had argued that the res judicata effect of the directed verdict would bar a future contribution claim. Referring to
judicial economy, however, the court held that the appellant should have filed its contribution claim before the directed verdict. Query whether this ruling actually bars the
appellant's contribution claim. Compare Tisoncik with the appellate court's ruling in Gay
v. Open Kitchens discussed infra notes 177-86 and accompanying text.
155. 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981). On comparative negligence in Illinois, see
Kionka, Comparative Negligence Comes to Illinois, 70 ILL B.J. 16 (1981). For comparative negligence generally, see V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1974) and H.
WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT: THE NEGLIGENCE CASE (1978).
156. No. 56306, slip op. (Ill. Sup. Ct. May 18, 1983).
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the employer directly because of the Workers' Compensation Act
bar. 15 7 In addition, the manufacturer-defendant could not sue
the decedent's employer for common law implied indemnity
because a manufacturer of a defective product cannot seek "downstream" recovery.15 8 Nor could the defendant seek contribution
because the decedent had died on January 24, 1978, prior to the
159
operative date for such claims.
Both the manufacturer's affirmative defenses were dismissed
pursuant to the plaintiffs motion to strike. The first affirmative
defense based on the comparative negligence of the plaintiffs
decedent was stricken on the ground that comparative negligence is not applicable to a products liability claim. The second
affirmative defense which raised the contributory negligence of
the decedent's employer was dismissed on the ground that the
manufacturer-defendant was jointly and severally liable under
existing case law and, therefore, the negligence of any absent
third party could not be used to diminish the plaintiffs recovery.
The Illinois Supreme court accepted the defendant's rule 308
petition for interlocutory appeal and addressed the following
issues:
(1) Whether the doctrine of comparative negligence or
fault is applicable to actions seeking recovery under products liability or strict liability theories?
(2) Whether the doctrine of comparative negligence or
fault eliminates joint and several liability?
(3) Whether the retention of joint and several liability in a
system of comparative negligence or fault denies equal
protection of the laws in violation of U.S. Constitutional
Amendment XIV, Section 1, and Section 2 of the Illinois
Constitution of 1970 as to causes of action arising on or
°
before March 1, 1978?16
As presented by the appellant's brief filed in Coney,16 1 the
affirmative argument as to whether the common law doctrine of
comparative negligence is applicable to proportionately reduce
the plaintiff's damages in a strict liability action relies princi138.1-138.30 (1981).
157. ILL REv. STAT. ch. 48,
158. See Burke v. Skyclimber, Inc., 57 Ill. 2d 542, 316 N.E.2d 516(1975). See supra note
53.
159. See supra note 11.
160. Brief for Appellant at 10, Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., No. 56306, slip op. (Ill. Sup.
Ct. May 18, 1983).
161. Id. at 15.
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pally on the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling in Skinner.1 62 The
Skinner court had little difficulty applying the right to contribution in the third-party action, although the primary claim was
based on strict liability. The court eschewed the "apples and
oranges" argument that negligence theories cannot be mixed
with underlying strict liability theories, by relying on comparative fault rather than comparative negligence.163 The subsequent
adoption of the pure form of comparative negligence in the Alvis
decision can be viewed as but the second half of a system of pure
justice. Indeed, the Alvis decision itself stated that the "pure
form of comparative negligence is the only system which truly
apportions damages according to the relative fault of the parties
'164
and thus achieves total justice.
In sum, the affirmative argument holds that negligence theories should be discarded or downplayed in favor of what has
come to be called the doctrine of comparative fault, so that cau1 65
sation rather than questions of moral culpability will be emphasized.
Frank recognition that our pure comparative negligence system
is in reality a pure comparative fault system will lead to the conclusion that there is no mixture of "apples" and "oranges" when
comparative fault is raised by a defendant in a products liability
166
claim.

162. 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977), modified, 70 Ill.
2d 16, cert. denied sub nom.
Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
163. No. 56306, slip op. at 7 (Ill. Sup. Ct. May 18, 1983).
164. 85 Ill. 2d at 27, 421 N.E.2d at 898 (emphasis added).
165. See generally H. WOODS, supra note 155.
166. Indeed, the vast majority of jurisdictions that have considered the impact of
comparative negligence upon strict liability have favored the extension of equitable risk
distribution by allowing the defense to be raised in a strict liability context. Some states
have accomplished this expansion by way of statute. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to
27-1765 (1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1982-1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 600.2945-2949 (1982-1983); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1982-1983). The
courts of Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, Oregon, Utah, and Wis-

consin have generally construed their comparative negligence statutes as applicable to
strict liability claims. See, respectively, Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming
Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D.C. Idaho 1976); Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 506, 618
P.2d 788 (1980); Edward v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975) (Mississippi
law); Zahrte v. Sturm Ruger & Co., 498 F. Supp. 389 (D.C. Mont. 1980); Thibault v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); Baccelleri v. Hyster Co., 287 Or. 3, 597
P.2d 351 (1979); Mulherin v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981); Dippel v.
Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). Those jurisdictions which have adopted
comparative negligence as a matter of common law and have considered whether the
doctrine is applicable in a products liability context have uniformly allowed the defense
by inference. See Butuad v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42
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In Coney, the Illinois Supreme court agreed with the affirmative argument in holding the defense of comparative fault applicable to strict liability cases. The court found no doctrinal incompatibility between comparative fault and strict liability principles
because the true conceptual basis for comparison is the causative
contribution of each party to the particular loss or injury. 16 7 Accordingly, the Coney court held that the defenses of misuse and
assumption of the risk will no longer bar recovery. 168 Instead,
such misconduct will simply be factored into the ultimate apportionment of damages. In all future strict liability trials, therefore,
where the defendant's liability is established and where both the
defective product and plaintiffs misconduct contribute to cause
the injury, the comparative fault principle will operate to reduce
plaintiffs recovery by the amount which the trier of fact finds
169
him at fault.
As to the second issue, whether comparative negligence has
eliminated common law joint and several liability, the principal
affirmative argument is that the doctrine of joint and several
liability is itself a judicially created doctrine based on equitable
considerations which no longer apply. 170 Historically, joint and
several liability developed as a corollary to the common law contributory negligence doctrine, which barred the plaintiff from
any recovery if found guilty of even the slightest negligence. To
balance any inequity that might result from such a harsh rule,
the innocent plaintiff was allowed to collect his entire judgment
from any defendant who was guilty of even the slightest negligence. However, with the adoption of comparative negligence,
since even a plaintiff who is ninety-nine percent responsible for

(Alaska 1976); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978); Auburn
Mach. Works Co. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1979); Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634
P.2d 1234 (1981).
167. No. 56306, slip op. at 8 (111. Sup. Ct. May 18, 1983).
168. Id. at 9.
169. In this sense, Coney is but the third leg in the trilogy; Skinner established contri-

bution between tortfeasors, Alvis established comparative negligence, and Coney holds
that application of such principles of causative apportionment in a strict liability context
is not doctrinally incompatible.
170. The Illinois Contribution Act itself states that "a plaintiffs right to recover the
full amount of his judgment from any one or more defendants subject to liability in tort
for the same injury to person or property, or for wrongful death, is not affected by the
provisions of this Act." ILL REV. STAT. ch. 70, 304 (1981). Of course, this merely begs the
question as to whether the common law adoption of comparative negligence has affected
the common law theory of joint and several liability. See infra text accompanying notes
172-74.
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his own injuries may recover from the defendant who is only one
percent responsible,171 it would appear that any justification for
joint and several liability no longer exists.
Nevertheless, the Illinois Supreme Court in Coney preserved
the doctrine of joint and several liability, holding that the adoption of comparative negligence in Alvis did not diminish the utility of this longstanding doctrine. 172 The court found that the
equities weighed in favor of the injured plaintiff, who need not
bear the burden of insolvent or immune defendants. 7 3 Lastly,
the court easily dispatched the equal protection argument by citing the rule that prospective application of a new doctrine or rule
of law does not violate equal protection laws under either the
74
federal or Illinois Constitutions.
SETrLEMENT AND RELEASE

Frequently, rather than shifting liability, a defendant may
attempt to end its liability by settling with the plaintiff. 175 Accompanying the settlement is a release signed by the parties,
wherein the plaintiff agrees not to pursue its claim in consideration of the settlement sum. However, assuming that settlements
and the finality of judgments are goals to be encouraged, the
present system of tort law in Illinois presents two curious anomalies.1 76 As a result, despite their well-meaning efforts to buy

171. See supra note 5; see also Boyles v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613
(Okla. 1980); and Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Okla. 1978) (abolishing joint

and several liability except in those cases where plaintiff is not contributorily negligent);
Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability,25 CALiF. L. REV. 413 (1937).
At least four states which have adopted comparative negligence have abrogated the
rule of joint and several liability: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-248a (1982); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41141 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1306 (19821983). At least two states, Oregon and Texas, retain joint and several liability only as to
each defendant whose negligence is greater than that of the claimant. Op, REv. STAT.
§ 18.485 (1981); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon 1982).
For a review of the argument in favor of the retention of joint and several liability in a
comparative negligence system, see American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.
3d 578, 578 P.2d 899 (1978).
172. No. 56306, slip op. at 13 (Ill. Sup. Ct. May 18, 1983).
173. Id. at 12.
174. Id. at 14.
175. The defendant may end its liability by securing a dismissal or a summary judgment. However, the defendant has little control over the court's decision to grant such
motions.
176. As to settlement problems arising in a comparative negligence system, see gen-
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complete peace, defendants may be kept in jeopardy.
The first disturbing flux in the law occurred in Gay v. Open
Kitchens, Inc.,177 where the plaintiff brought a personal injury
action against both the owner and the general contractor of the
premises where he fell. The plaintiff claimed that he fell into a
ramp-pit adjacent to a loading dock at the premises because the
contractor had failed to install a restraining chain and the
owner had failed to specifly that this be done.178 The general
contractor sought and secured a summary judgment against the
plaintiff.179 Thereafter, the owner filed a third-party claim against
the general contractor for implied indemnity under the theory of
active-passive negligence. The general contractor then filed a
second motion for summary judgment as to the third-party claim
on the ground that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the
action. The contractor argued that because summary judgment
had been previously entered in its favor against the original
80
plaintiff, it could not be liable to the owner on a third-party claim.
Although the trial court granted this second motion for summary judgment, the appellate court reversed.' 8 '
According to the appellate court, a prior judgment may constitute collateral estoppel only when the party against whom it is
applied had an effective opportunity to litigate the issue in the
prior action. 18 2 In Gay, although the owner had notice of the
contractor's first motion for summary judgment against the
plaintiff, no third-party action was pending at that time. Thus,
when the first summary judgment in favor of the general contractor was entered, the owner and the general contractor were
mere codefendants and nonadversaries both legally and factually. 183 As such, the owner had no right to appeal the first summary judgment. If the owner were then collaterally estopped
from bringing a third-party claim against the general contractor,
his rights against the general contractor would have been adjudicated without any right of review-a clearly unjust result. The

erally Gordon & Crowley, Indemnity Issues in Settlement of Multi-Party Actions in
ComparativeNegligence Jurisdictions,48 INs. CoUNS. J. 457 (1981).
177. 100 Ill. App. 3d 968, 427 N.E.2d 338 (1981).
178. Id. at 969-70, 427 N.E.2d at 340.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 971, 427 N.E.2d at 341.
181. Id. at 972, 427 N.E.2d at 342.
182. Id. at 971, 427 N.E.2d at 341.
183. Id.
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court found this equitable consideration especially persuasive. 184
Nevertheless, the holding in Gay contravenes previous rulings
of the Illinois Appellate Court as well as a federal court decision
interpreting Illinois law 1 85 and will have several discouraging effects. First, it will add to the congestion of the courts by
retaining parties who should have been dismissed following a
favorable summary judgment order. In addition, the rule undermines the goal of finality of judgments.
The second unfavorable trend involves the discouragement of
settlements. As Van Jacobs v. Parikh 86 makes clear, the settling defendant is only protected from contribution claims, not
indemnity claims.' 87 Because the defendant will be unable to
buy complete peace by compromising with the plaintiff, the
incentive to settle will diminish. Nor is it likely that the defendant will be able to secure an indemnity agreement from the
plaintiff, for that would destroy any incentive to pursue the
remaining defendant should the latter appear to have a strong
indemnity claim. Given the legislature's stated policy preference
in favor of settlements with its enactment of the Contribution
Act, the Van Jacobs court would have been justified in including
indemnity claims within the purview of the Act's bar.
CONCLUSION
The adoption of contribution in Skinner and comparative negligence in Alvis has had a major impact on third-party practice
in Illinois. Implied indemnity has apparently survived the adoption of contribution, but has been returned to its historical pos-

184. Id.
185. McLellan v. Columbus 1-70 West Auto-Truck Stop, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 1233 (N.D.
Ill. 1981); Karon v. E.H. Marhoeffer, Jr. Co., 14 Ill. App. 3d 274, 302 N.E.2d 478 (1973); see
generally Judge & Schirott, Judgments: CollateralEstoppel, Chi. Daily L. Bull., Feb. 3,
1982, at 1, col. 1.
186. 97 Ill. App. 3d 610, 422 N.E.2d 979 (1981).
187. Where there are multiple plaintiffs and the party seeking contribution can only
recover for the damages attributable to one of the plaintiffs, it is the defendant's responsibility to allocate properly the amounts paid in settlement so that it can recover on its
contribution claim. This allocation should be set out within the settlement documents.
Houser v. Witt, 111 Ill. App. 3d 123, 443 N.E.2d 725 (1982). In addition, the employer's
settlement of his employee's claims under the Worker's Compensation Act will not give
rise to the bar against contribution set out in sections 2(c) and 2(d) of the Contribution
Act. See supra note 132; Le Master v. Amsted Indus. Inc., 110 Ill. App. 3d 729, 442 N.E.2d
1367 (1982).
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ture of requiring a pre-tort relationship in addition to a qualitative distinction between the parties' conduct. In the future,
implied indemnity should be used by those parties having some
kind of contractual relationship, such as lessor-lessee or common
enterprise. Contractual indemnity also remains a viable risk
shifting device, as the courts' preference for contractual allocation of risk and the dismantling of the Westinghouse rule illustrates.
Contribution has, however, eliminated the need for equitable
apportionment. In fact, recent rulings indicate that traditional
tort immunity bars will not prevent a contribution action and
that the allocation of liability based on fault will prevail.
The effects of comparative negligence and its relationship to
joint and several liability in Illinois have been recently explained
by the supreme court in Coney. Unlike several comparative negligence states which have either modified the rule or abrogated it
entirely, Illinois has opted to retain joint and several liability in
its common law form.
In sum, defendants must be wary of dismissals and settlements in the primary suit which may leave them exposed to
third-party actions. As recent case law has indicated, such measures will not end a defendant's liability completely.

